博彩对冲

World leaders often pay lip service to efforts aimed at thwarting the proliferation of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons. They stumble over the very term 鈥� non-proliferation 鈥� while publicly proclaiming support for the concept, and then ignore it when other priorities take precedence. Such is currently the case with US President Joe Biden鈥檚 push to realign Mideast politics by establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Part of the prospective deal includes US assistance for Saudi Arabia鈥檚 growing nuclear program, reportedly also including access to uranium enrichment technology. The risk is that this could provide a pathway to further nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East.

The benefits of a Saudi-Israeli alliance are compelling. From Washington鈥檚 standpoint, such an alliance could help counter Iranian, Russian and Chinese influence in the region, halt the war in Yemen and perhaps even keep prices at the pump low during the US election season. Saudi Arabia sees the deal as a means to secure better treatment for the Palestinians and to work more closely with both Israel and the US to curb Iran鈥檚 nuclear program. But providing more nuclear technology to a conflict-prone region that has long engaged in both overt and covert nuclear activity carries inherent risks.  

As part of what he called "the biggest historical deal since the end of the Cold War," Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is demanding a formal defense pact with the US. What this would look like in practice is not yet known, but recent reports have speculated that it could resemble the agreement Washington reached with South Korea this year. That could effectively put Saudi Arabia under the US nuclear umbrella, meaning that Washington, in theory, would be willing to use its nuclear arsenal against anyone threatening the kingdom's survival. Riyadh is also insisting on support for its civilian nuclear program, including the right to enrich uranium locally and eventually export nuclear fuel, according to reports.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 鈥� the loudest critic of Iran鈥檚 enrichment program, and the leader arguably most responsible for the demise of the ground breaking 2015 nuclear deal that put guardrails around it 鈥� is going along with some of the Saudi demands, including, apparently, uranium enrichment. His foreign minister, Eli Cohen, in the Wall Street Journal that a strong US defense pact "would make individual nuclear ambitions unnecessary" 鈥� Saudi Arabia would no longer have reason to develop its own nuclear weapons. Israel has maintained a policy of opacity toward its own nuclear arsenal since it first crossed the nuclear threshold in the late 1960s, and never acknowledges (or denies) the existence of its weapons.

Saudi Arabia should not need uranium enrichment capacity, and presumably wants this for strategic reasons. If and when Riyadh does finally build a nuclear power plant, there is plenty of enrichment capacity in the West to fill its requirements, and building its own enrichment capacity would make little sense economically.

Proponents of such a deal presumably argue that a Saudi enrichment plant under US control would reduce the risk of a Saudi weapons program, because using it for nuclear weapons would require the Saudis to hijack the civil project. Such an action would cross a political red line no doubt, and alert the world to what might be coming next, but then what? And what difference would any intervention ultimately make if and when the Saudis actually developed a weapon? In other words, does sharing technology really deter a would-be proliferator, or just plant the seed for another nuclear-armed state?

It's unclear whether the US is considering only allowing enrichment or actually providing such capabilities, but either way the assumption among nuclear experts is that the US would want to maintain some degree of control over whatever enrichment effort the Saudis might pursue. If a plant were to be supplied by the US, that would present challenges because the US basically has little to offer. It was forced to close its uneconomic gaseous diffusion enrichment plants long ago, and centrifuge and laser enrichment technologies still under development in the US are a long way from commercial viability. So the Saudis may need to shop around.

Avalanche of Criticism

Media reports on the enrichment component of the larger deal unleashed an avalanche of criticism across the political spectrum in both the US and Israel. A  Sep. 21, signed by 27 nonproliferation experts, urged Biden to reject Saudi demands for uranium enrichment 鈥渁s part of or separate from a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel.鈥� Signed by two former deputy director generals of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and many other former top-level US intelligence and counter-proliferation officials, the letter warned that any deal allowing enrichment in the kingdom would pose 鈥渁n unacceptable proliferation risk, particularly given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman鈥檚 comments on nuclear weapons.鈥�

The crown prince in 2018 CBS that Saudi Arabia did not want to acquire a nuclear weapon, but if Iran developed one, Riyadh would 鈥渇ollow suit as soon as possible." On Sep. 20 he the warning, saying that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would 鈥渉ave to get one, for security reasons and balance of power鈥� 鈥� while adding 鈥渂ut we don鈥檛 want to see that." There could be other compelling reasons as well: As Saudi Arabia looks to a future of declining oil demand, its sway in the world will decline. What better substitute for status and world power than nuclear weapons?

Regional Race

With or without an alliance with Israel, and irrespective of his efforts to mend ties with Iran, Crown Prince Mohammed will likely continue to press for nuclear parity with Iran, and his comments have renewed concerns around a long-feared regional race to the bomb. The UAE, which built the region鈥檚 first large-scale nuclear plant at Barakah, recently announced plans for a fuel fabrication plant to make fuel assemblies for its reactors. Such a plant poses no direct proliferation threat per se, but it would normalize the movement of nuclear fuel in the region, which currently goes largely untracked.

In its with the US that allowed Barakah to proceed, the UAE promised to forswear uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing (which yields plutonium), but there is an escape clause. Specifically, the agreement states that the terms and conditions 鈥渟hall be no less favorable in scope and effect鈥� than in any other agreement with a non-nuclear weapon state in the Middle East (beyond what existed when the agreement was signed in 2009). Should an imbalance ever occur, the UAE could request to renegotiate the deal 鈥渟o that the position described above is restored,鈥� the agreement states in its last paragraph.

Iran is well along the road to nuclear weapons, should it ultimately choose to develop them. A clandestine program to achieve that aim was halted in 2003, according to US intelligence, but there are no guarantees for the future. Like most other secret nuclear weapons efforts, Iran鈥檚 could not have happened without cover of a 鈥減eaceful鈥� program, which allowed for the training of hundreds of engineers and scientists, as well as giving them access to sensitive technologies and equipment.

Saudi Arabia also asserts that its nuclear program is for civilian use, and last week said it will implement full-scope safeguards of its nuclear activities by the IAEA; however, it has not said it would agree to further, more comprehensive inspections under the so-called Additional Protocol.

Technology Providers

Riyadh is already reviewing bids from South Korea, France, China and Russia for its first conventional large-scale nuclear plant, and it's developing a prototype small reactor with South Korea. Excluded from the list of candidates for the main plant was US-based Westinghouse 鈥� for lack of a US-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement. The original stumbling block to such an agreement was Saudi Arabia鈥檚 reluctance to forswear enrichment. However, in its determination to regain dominance in the nuclear export field, and normalize Saudi-Israeli relations, the US government appears prepared to not only back down on that demand, but to go out of its way to facilitate Saudi access to the technology.

The US has only one enrichment company 鈥� publicly-traded Centrus, which is the rump of what was once the world's largest commercial enrichment enterprise, operated by the US Department of Energy (DOE). Headed by former Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Poneman, Centrus has for years struggled unsuccessfully to regain even a fragment of the enrichment business that the US once had鈥� and lost because its gaseous diffusion technology proved far more expensive than the centrifuge technology that other operators adopted.

Centrus makes money by trading enriched uranium (mostly from Russia) and through DOE contracts. It boasts a single demonstration cascade that will be used to produce higher-enriched uranium (of up to 20%) for DOE's "advanced" reactor program. But its machines are large, unwieldy and prone to breakdown and will likely never prove commercially profitable. However, with its close ties to DOE, the company could yet emerge as a player in a Saudi deal involving enrichment. A company spokesperson last week denied any role in the talks.

Whatever happens, if the US is truly considering greenlighting uranium enrichment for Saudi Arabia, it risks creating deeper dangers in the years ahead. Who will be next up for similar treatment? And will the guardrails that exist to prevent the spread of such dangerous technologies eventually disappear?

Stephanie Cooke is the former editor of Nuclear Intelligence Weekly and author of In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.