博彩对冲

Last month, US President Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei鈥檚 respective positions regarding Iran鈥檚 nuclear enrichment program appeared irreconcilable. Today, the prohibitive costs associated with any US-Iranian military conflict are so horrible that both leaders have embraced negotiations as the only viable path forward for their respective nations and for regional and global security.

One of the main intellectual obstacles that needs to be overcome when evaluating the current situation between the US and Iran is the notion that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, represents the 鈥済old standard鈥� when it comes to US-Iranian negotiations regarding Iran鈥檚 nuclear program. While the Obama administration talked about creating a situation in which Iran, seeing sanctions reduced, would start focusing on its economy and lessening its provocative activities in the region, it may also have viewed the deal鈥檚 so-called 鈥渟unset clauses,鈥� which put time constraints on critical aspects of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program, as simply a mechanism for buying time before a decision would need to be made about using military force to eliminate Iran鈥檚 nuclear capability. In April 2015, President Obama told NPR that once the 鈥渟unset clauses鈥� expired, the US would evaluate Iran鈥檚 nuclear program and ambitions. If economic and political engagement did not bring about fundamental changes in Iran, to include Iran abandoning its pursuit of uranium enrichment, 鈥淲e still have the options available to me 鈥� or available to a future president that I have available to me right now.鈥� Those 鈥渙ptions鈥� were built around the notion of military intervention.

Iran was likewise fully aware of the fatal flaws that condemned the JCPOA to an early demise. The domestic political opposition to the JCPOA was made clear to the senior Iranian leadership in the form of a March 2015 letter written by senior Senate Republicans to the Supreme Leader, which stated outright that even if the Obama administration were able to finalize the JCPOA, the next president of the US, if Republican, would simply pull out of the nuclear deal. Iranian parliamentarians debated this very point in the lead up to the JCPOA entering force, and the Supreme Leader instructed the Iranian government to be prepared for such an eventuality.

Breakout Window

In April 2015, the 鈥渂reakout window鈥� 鈥� a calculation based on how much time Iran would need if it made the political decision to build a nuclear weapon to enrich enough weapons grade (i.e., above 90%) uranium for use in a single nuclear fission device 鈥� was measured at around three months. The JCPOA was designed to bring that number up to one year. Once the 鈥渟unset clauses鈥� of the JCPOA expired, this number could drop to weeks 鈥� although Tehran would have agreed to permanent invasive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections by ratifying the Additional Protocol that would have immediately flagged any shifts in its enrichment or potential weaponization activities. Moreover, based upon the plan of action contained in a law adopted by the Iranian government on Oct. 13, 2015, in case of US noncompliance with and/or withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Iranians were prepared to expand their program to achieve this reduced breakout window in an accelerated fashion.

Trump always claimed that he wanted a 鈥渂etter deal.鈥� The question remains as to what a 鈥渂etter deal鈥� would consist of. One option allows Iran to retain a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle program that caps uranium enrichment to 3.7% U-235 (the level used in the manufacture of fuel rods for Iran鈥檚 nuclear reactors used to produce electricity). Another, favored by US hardliners and Israel, would prohibit all nuclear enrichment, as well as Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile program and what the US and Israel term 鈥渞egional malign activities鈥� 鈥� support for Hezbollah and the Houthis.

In this regard, Iran has become its own worst enemy. Over the course of the past year, senior Iranian officials, past and present, have made public statements that, in their totality, amount a declared policy that positions Iran as a nuclear weapons state. These statements outline the conditions under which a political decision to produce nuclear weapons could be made and the speed at which such a decision could be implemented. Based upon Iran鈥檚 own statements, the breakout window has been reduced to weeks 鈥� well below the one year window envisioned by the JCPOA and the three months that existed before the JCPOA was finalized.

Technical Capabilities

Iran鈥檚 technical capabilities seem to align with this new declaratory policy. Iran has perfected the processes associated with the manufacture of uranium metal necessary to produce a nuclear weapon (this was achieved by producing 20% enriched uranium metal plates for use in the Tehran Research Reactor.) Iran has accumulated stocks of 60% enriched uranium, for which there is no legitimate purpose in Iran鈥檚 peaceful nuclear construct, sufficient to produce three to five nuclear bombs (as of February 2025, Iran had 275 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium; it is estimated that 42 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium are needed to produce a single weapon).

Building a nuclear device is one thing; delivering it as a weapon is another. Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile program has demonstrated mastery of the heat shielding technology necessary to protect sensitive fusing and arming systems during re-entry. Moreover, Iran has mastered hypersonic technology, which has proven capable of penetrating Israel鈥檚 missile defense shield, even when augmented by US ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Former President Obama negotiated the JCPOA, which in legitimizing Iran鈥檚 nuclear enrichment program represented a pointed departure form the 鈥渘ot one spinning centrifuge鈥� mentality that had defined the Obama policy posture prior to the nuclear agreement, because the only alternative to negotiation was war. In 2014, the main concern of the US in militarily confronting Iran was that Iran would be able to disrupt global energy security in a way that would be devastating to the US and world economies.

Today, Trump has put the US in a similar position 鈥� negotiation or war. But the consequences of military action are far greater today than they were in 2014-15. Iran today has placed significant aspects of its nuclear program underground in deeply buried reinforced structures impervious to even the biggest conventional munitions in the US inventory, the GBU-57 30,000 pound 鈥渕assive ordnance penetrator.鈥� In short, the US cannot destroy Iran鈥檚 buried nuclear infrastructure using conventional munitions. Nor can we interdict sufficiently Iran鈥檚 conventional ballistic missile retaliatory capability. The consequences of a failed US conventional attack on Iran鈥檚 nuclear infrastructure would be devastating; Iran would most likely be able to produce a nuclear weapon unimpeded and, if Iran went the route of a gun-design, quickly. Moreover, Iran would be able to launch a devastating ballistic missile strike against Israel and US regional military targets and disrupt global energy supplies.

The only military option available to the US is one that incorporates low-yield nuclear weapons into the mix 鈥� so-called 鈥渦sable nukes.鈥� During Trump鈥檚 first administration, he ordered that the US nuclear posture and employment policies and plans be adapted to incorporate new categories of nuclear weapons, including the B-61-12 nuclear penetrator and the W-76-2 low-yield warhead for the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile. These weapons are now available and have been positioned for possible use against Iran 鈥� an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is on station in the Indian Ocean, and up to 40 B-61-12 bombs are stored in Hawaii, along with nuclear warheads for use on the Navy鈥檚 Tomahawk cruise missile.

The Bottom Line

The realistic threat posed by US nuclear weapons, when combined with the horrible consequences which would accrue through their use, have created a real impetus for a negotiated settlement between the US and Iran on nuclear issues. Already, three rounds of discussion have taken place, with talks advancing to the point of technical discussions regarding how to implement a deal. Both the US and Iran must overcome considerable resistance to any deal from conservative elements from each of their respective domestic political realities. But both Trump and Khamenei appear to be committed to avoiding conflict, which means that as long as any outside factors (such as the ongoing conflict between the US and the Houthis) don鈥檛 impede the processes of dialogue, there is a real prospect for a negotiated end to the US-Iran nuclear crisis.

Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer whose service over a 20-plus-year career included tours of duty in the former Soviet Union implementing arms control agreements, serving on the staff of US General Norman Schwarzkopf during the Gulf War and later as a chief weapons inspector with the UN in Iraq from 1991-98. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.